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NEW APPROACH TO THE TRANSFER OF
APPRECIATED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO DIVORCE
When appreciated property is transferred pursuant to a property settle-
ment in a divorce or separation, the federal income tax consequences may
vary considerably depending upon state law. The Internal Revenue Code
requires that the entire amount of gain or loss from the sale or exchange of
property be taxed,1 and whether the transfer of appreciated property in
contemplation of divorce is such a sale or exchange depends on the
jurisdiction in which the settlement is negotiated. In community property
states, the transfer of appreciated property pursuant to a divorce usually
results in a nontaxable division of property between the co-owners. 2 Such a
transfer may result in a taxable event, however, in common law states. When
in a common law state the interest of the wife in property acquired during
marriage is found to be less than that of a co-owner, the transfer of property
1. Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Computation of gain or loss.
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess
of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section
1011 of the Code for determining gain ....
(b) Amount realized.
The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be
the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received.
Section 1002 of the Code provides: "Except as otherwise provided . . . on the sale or
exchange of property the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under section
1001, shall be recognized."
2. "[Community property's] basic principle is that whatever is acquired during a
marriage by the efforts of either spouse belongs, on acquisition, in equal halves to
husband and wife." 4A R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 625, at 714 (P.
Rohan rev. ed. 1974).
When property is divided equally in a community property state pursuant to a property
settlement, the division will not constitute a taxable event because of each person's vested
interest in one-half of the property. Neither spouse will realize gain or loss on the
transfer and the cost basis of the property will remain the same. However, when either
the husband or the wife purchases the other's share for more than its basis, the gain will
be taxable to the seller. Such a transaction is most likely when community property is
made up almost entirely of one asset which cannot be divided, such as a business. If the
parties do not want to sell the business, one party may buy out the other and the result
will be a purchase and a sale. See Rudick, Tax Consequences of Marriage and Its
Termination, American Law Institute and the American Bar Association's Joint Commit-
tee on Continuing Legal Education, 146-47 (1974).
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will require the transferor to pay a tax on the difference between his basis
and the appreciated value of the property at the time of the transfer.8
Recently, however, the Tenth Circuit held in Imel v. United States4 that
the transfer of appreciated stock to the wife pursuant to a property settle-
ment in a common law state was a division by co-owners of jointly owned
property resulting in no capital gain taxable to the husband. The court
found that under the law of Colorado, the wife had a "species" of common
ownership which vested at the time of the filing of the divorce action.5 Imel
is important because it enlarged prior case law by holding that a nontaxable
property division may take place in common law states under a new concept
of equitable interest in marital property. Thus, despite the absence of a
community property statute, a wife can be found to be a co-owner based on
the recognition of her contribution toward the acquisition of jointly acquired
property. Imel also raises the question of whether a state court is competent
to make a conclusive determination of what is a taxable event for federal
income tax purposes.0 This article will examine the income tax conse-
quences of a division of property pursuant to a divorce in the context of
various types of property ownership, and whether, in light of Imel, the
question of what degree of ownership must be found in order to create a
nontaxable division has been resolved.
3. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The tax consequences of such a
transfer are illustrated by Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974). In
Wiles, the husband transferred stock to his wife pursuant to a property settlement. His
basis in the stock was $83,169.65. The fair market value was $550,000. This resulted
in a capital gains tax of $109,650.54. The recipient of the property in such a
transfer pays no tax until there is a disposition. Thus, the wife takes the property at fair
market value (a stepped up basis). The wife's tax consequences were not in issue in
Davis, but the Court observed that at that time it was the practice of the Internal
Revenue Service not to treat such a transaction as a taxable event to the wife. 370
U.S. at 73 n.7. After the Davis decision, the Service issued Rev. Rul. 221, 1967-2
CUM. BULL. 63, which formally confirmed the prior practice of exempting the wife
from taxation and allowing her to use the market value of the transferred property as
her basis.
4. 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
5. Id. at 857. The issue of whether the transfer is a sale or exchange within section
1002 of the Code arises when title to jointly acquired property is held in the name of one
spouse. When property is held in joint tenancy or in tenancy by the entirety and is
divided equally between the co-owners, there is no sale or exchange and no gain is
assessed until there is a disposition. See Rev. Rul. 437, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 507.
6. State law controls only when the federal law expressly or impliedly makes
operation of the tax law dependent upon state law. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188,
194 (1938). When state law does control, federal courts must ascertain and apply state
law. Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236 (1944). The field of domestic relations
belongs exclusively to the laws of the states. McCarty v. Hollis, 120 F.2d 540, 542
(10th Cir. 1941). See also Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799
(1943).
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I. Davis AND ITS AFTERMATH
Before 1962, the courts in common law jurisdictions had been divided on
the issue of whether a taxpayer must recognize gain as a result of a property
transfer pursuant to a divorce. 7 The Supreme Court resolved the dispute in
United States v. Davis.8 'Pursuant to a property settlement entered into
prior to divorce, Mr. Davis had transferred 1,000 shares of stock held in his
name to his wife for a release of any and all claims she might have against
him. Mr. Davis contended that the transfer was a nontaxable division of
property between co-owners. The government argued that the transfer was
a "taxable transfer of property in exchange for the release of an independent
legal obligation." 9  The Court held that the transfer constituted a taxable
event and that the husband must recognize gain on the transfer of the
property to the extent that the fair market value of the property exceeded its
basis.' 0
In order to determine whether the property transfer amounted to a
division of property or a transfer for a release of a legal obligation, the Court
looked to Delaware law." It concluded that the inchoate rights granted a
wife in her husband's property by Delaware law did not "even remotely
reach the dignity of co-ownership.' 2 The wife was found to have no
control over the management or disposition of the property; her inchoate
rights were not descendible; and upon dissolution of the marriage, she was
eligible to receive only what the court determined was reasonable. While
7. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 918 (1960) (agreement that husband give up interest in option in consideration for
release of wife's marital rights not a taxable event); Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d
642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943) (transfer of property for release
of wife's marital rights taxable event for husband); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d
986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942) (transfer of property in complete
satisfaction of wife's support claims taxable to husband).
8. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See note 3 supra.
9. Id. at 69. "Marital rights" and independent legal obligations refer, in part, to one
spouse's duty to support the other spouse during marriage, to dower, and to the right to
an intestate share. See Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929, 930 (2d Cir. 1946).
10. 370 U.S. at 74.
11. In regard to property division pursuant to a divorce, the relevant Delaware statute
provided:
When a divorce shall be decreed for the aggression of the husband, the com-
plainant shall be restored to all her real estate, and allowed, out of her hus-
band's real and personal estate, such share as the court thinks reasonable; but
if the divorce be for the wife's aggression, the court may restore the whole or
a part of her real estate, and also such share of her husband's personal property
as seems reasonable.
24 Del. Laws, ch. 221 §§ 15, 16, as amended, 25 Del. Laws, ch. 213 § 4 (now DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1527 (1974)).
12. 370 U.S. at 70.
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conceding that there was some merit to Mr. Davis' position, the Court stated
that "[r]egardless of the tags, Delaware seems only to place a burden on the
husband's property rather than to make the wife a part owner thereof.' 3
The transfer was equated with the husband's legal obligations of support and
alimony. 14 The Court concluded that the transfer was in satisfaction of an
independent legal obligation and was therefore a taxable event. The Davis
Court further held that the relinquished marital rights were equal in value to
the property transferred, and the taxable gain thus realized upon such a
transaction would be measured as though the parties were dealing at arm's
length.' 5
Although the Supreme Court based its decision in Davis on its interpreta-
tion of Delaware law, some observers have interpreted Davis as establish-
ing that all transfers of appreciated property in property settlements are
taxable events regardless of state law.' 6 Several subsequent court decisions
have given state law only cursory examination by repeating the Davis
Court's statement of Delaware law and applying it to the particular state
involved.17 A careful reading of Davis shows, however, that under the laws
13. Id.
14. Id. at 70-71. The right to alimony is separate and distinct from the right to
division of property jointly acquired by the parties during the marriage. The doctrine of
alimony is based upon the common law obligation of the husband to support his wife.
See 2c VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 259 (1932). The income tax provisions
governing the taxation of alimony provide that periodic payments made by the husband
pursuant to a divorce decree are includible in the wife's gross income and deductible
by the husband. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(a)(1), 215. The payment of a lump
sum discharging a part of an obligation is considered a property settlement and is
neither includible in the wife's income nor deductible by the payor. Id. §§ 71(c)(1),
215.
Division of property, on the other hand, is based on the wife's right to a just and
equitable share of that property which has been accumulated by the parties as a result of
their joint efforts during their years of marriage. In this sense, the marital relationship
is analogous to a partnership. Since in common law jurisdictions the property rights of
the wife have generally not been found to arise until dissolution of the marriage,
attempted divisions of property have been treated as property settlements for income tax
purposes. See Graves, Federal Taxation in Separation and Divorce, 29 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1 (1972); Note, Federal Taxation: Tax Consequences of Divorce Property Settle-
ments, 1963 DUKE L.J. 365, 370; Note, Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-Taxable
Event?, 17 STAN. L. REV. 478, 482 (1965).
15. 370 U.S. at 72.
16. See, e.g., Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1037 (1948); 6 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL
TAXATION § 37.48 (rev. ed. 1975); Comment, Federal Tax Aspects of Divorce and
Separation, 44 Miss. L.J. 740, 755 (1973). This interpretation is probably based on the
fact that no property statute in a common law state gives the wife the traditional
ownership criteria cited in Davis, see p. 618-19 supra, as lacking in the Delaware statute.
17. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 836 (1964) (Davis rule applied when no voluntary property settlement had been
reached).
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of other states, a property settlement pursuant to a divorce may constitute a
division of marital property as opposed to a taxable exchange.' 8
The Tax Court and circuit courts have arrived at disparate results in
interpreting state statutes. Efforts to have the courts interpret the laws of
Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, New York, and Wisconsin in such a way that a non-
taxable division of property would be possible have not met with success.' 9
A series of cases in the Tenth Circuit is illustrative. The cases required
the court to analyze Oklahoma property law. In Collins v. Commissioner,20
a taxpayer transferred securities with a basis of $20,090 and an appreciated
market value of $532,000 to his wife in a divorce settlement. The husband
had brought a small amount of stock in a corporation into the marriage and
after the marriage had inherited a large block of stock in the same
company. 21 At the time of the divorce settlement, the husband transferred
a substantial block of the stock to his wife but failed to report the transfer or
the capital gains on the stock. The husband contended that because
Oklahoma law conferred property ownership rights on his wife, the transfer
was thus a nontaxable division of property.2z The Commissioner disagreed
and assessed a deficiency. 2"
The Tenth Circuit agreed that under Davis it was required to look to
Oklahoma law to determine the exact nature of the disposition for tax
18. The Court explicitly recognized that such differing results were possible:
Although admittedly such a view may permit different tax treatment among the
several States, this Court in the past has not ignored the differing effects on
the federal taxing scheme of substantive differences between community prop-
erty and common-law systems.
370 U.S. at 71.
19. See, e.g., Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 831 (1971) (Iowa - transferred securities were not included in settlement
agreement but were ordered transferred by divorce court; transfer constituted taxable
event); Kraut v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (court found
taxable event but stated it would have looked at state law if state court had made a
definitive ruling on the subject); Matthews v. United States, 425 F.2d 738 (Ct. Cl.
1970) (Florida and New York - husband gave up very limited rights under Florida
law but wife's transfer of appreciated securities to husband resulted in $1.25 million
in capital gains); Swaim v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 302 (1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 353
(6th Cir. 1969) (Kentucky - tax court regarded Davis as providing federal criteria).
J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 344 n.76 (2d ed. 1973).
20. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated per curian, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
21. Id. at 353. The wife brought into the marriage approximately $10,000. The
corporation in which the husband was a major stockholder had prospered greatly during
the marriage.
22. Oklahoma is not a community property state. Nonetheless, Mr. Collins contend-
ed that Oklahoma had created by statute unique rights in the parties to the marriage that
resembled those found in community property states. Id. at 355. See OKLA. STAT. tit.
12 § 1278 (1961), quoted note 25 infra.
23. 46 T.C. 461 (1966).
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purposes. 24  Concluding that there had been no property division as Mr.
Collins argued, the court interpreted the Oklahoma law as affording the
wife no vested interest in her husband's property prior to the divorce
decree.25 The Court held that the transfer was a taxable event because
Oklahoma law did not give the wife traditional ownership rights in property
such as a descendible interest, the right to control and manage, and a right to
disposition.20
Shortly after Mr. Collins challenged in federal court his obligation to pay
federal income tax on the transfer, he challenged in state court his obligation
to pay a similar state income tax.27  The Oklahoma Supreme Court found
that the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Oklahoma law had been incorrect
and that the nature of the wife's interest under Oklahoma law was similar in
concept to that of community property in community property states,
concluding that the property was "held by a species of common ownership. ' 28
Although this interest was not descendible, the court distinguished the
Oklahoma statute from the Delaware statute at issue in Davis on the ground
that the Oklahoma statute placed a mandatory duty upon the court to divide
24. 388 F.2d at 355. 'There is no dispute but that we must, as the Supreme Court
did in the Davis case ... look to the state law controlling the disposition of the property
to determine the exact nature of that disposition for tax characteristic purposes." Id.
25. The Oklahoma statute provided in part:
As to such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired by
the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either
or both of said parties, the court shall make such division between the parties
respectively as may appear just and reasonable, by a division of the property
in kind, or by setting the same apart to one of the parties, and requiring the
other thereof to pay such sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair and
just division thereof.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1278 (1951).
26. 388 F.2d at 357-58. The court stated that
[w]hatever the nature of the rights granted by Oklahoma law to spouses in
jointly acquired property it is clear they do not include the traditional owner-
ship rights in property. These rights such as descendible interest, right to con-
trol and disposition of property and vested interest are set out by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Davis . . . as factors that distinguish a marital divi-
sion in satisfaction of a legal obligation from a division between co-owners.
Since these traditional elements of co-ownership are lacking, the fact that in
making a decision the state courts speak as though they were dividing property
between co-owners does not prevent the federal courts from saying that for tax
purposes the division was in satisfaction of a marital obligation and thus tax-
able.
Id.
27. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968) (Collins 11).
28. Id. at 295. The court indicated that "[t]he fact record title is in the husband by
reason of conveyance or contract does not destroy such joint ownership, since the plain
language of the statute precludes such requirement." Id.
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the jointly acquired property in a "just and reasonable" manner. 29  As a
result of this mandatory duty, the court held that the wife possessed a vested
interest in jointly acquired property of the marital relationship. Thus the
transfer was held to constitute a nontaxable division of property between co-
owners for purposes of state income tax.
After the state court determination, Mr. Collins appealed the Tenth
Circuit decision to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
remanded 30 in light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statute. On remand, the Tenth Circuit,3 I having the benefit of an authorita-
tive interpretation of state law, concluded in Collins IV that "the stock trans-
fer operated merely to finalize the extent of the wife's vested interest in
property" and that therefore the transfer was nontaxable a2
Significantly, the appeals court in Collins IV did not read Davis as having
created federal criteria which were required to be met before the rights
conferred by state law could be said to constitute co-ownership.33 Under
such a reading, state courts were free to find co-ownership under individual
statutes regardless of whether the general ownership characteristics cited in
Davis were present.
Subsequent ,to Collins IV, however, in Wiles v. Commissioner,3 4 the Tax
Court found the transfer of appreciated property to be a taxable event even
when the state statute in question was indistinguishable from the Oklahoma
law cited in Collins. The court read Davis to require a finding that the
transfer constituted a nontaxable division only if the property interest a wife
had in the divided property was as large as the interest of a wife in a
community property state.3 5  The relevant Kansas law, as the Tax Court
interpreted it, did not elevate the wife's interest to one resembling co-
ownership.r 6 The Tax Court went on to note that the question of whether a
29. Id.
30. Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968) (Collins 111).
31. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969) (Collins IV).
32. Id. at 212.
33. Id. The Tenth Circuit indicated that the Davis Court had "merely discussed
certain general characteristics of co-ownership in an attempt to determine whether the
wife possessed the rights of a co-owner under state law." Id.
34. 60 T.C. 56 (1973). A taxpayer and his wife had reached a voluntary agreement
in which neither would claim alimony and their property would be equally divided. The
value of the property in the taxpayer's name exceeded that in his wife's name. As a
result, he agreed to transfer some property in his name to his wife.
35. Id. at 60. The difficulty with this view is that the Supreme Court must have been
aware of the obvious differences between the wife's interest in Oklahoma and her interest
in a community property state when it remanded Collins III.
36. This is rather surprising since Oklahoma law is derived from Kansas law and
the court acknowledged this fact. Id. The statute provided in relevant part:
(b) The decree shall divide the real and personal property of the parties,
[Vol. 25:616
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wife's interest in the marital property constituted an ownership interest was
still unanswered in Kansas.3 7  Although the Kansas statute, like that of
Oklahoma, required upon divorce an equitable division of property of the
marriage, regardless of legal title,38 the court stated that without a Kansas
decision flatly stating that a property settlement in Kansas was a division of
property between co-owners, it was unwilling to so hold.3 9
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision and held the transfer
in Wiles to be a taxable event.40  The court stated that under Kansas law,
the determination of the wife's interest was wholly within the discretion of
the trial court. The trial court had a mandate to divide the property in a
just and reasonable manner, and it could consider the contribution of each
party, earning capacity, fault, and the needs of the parties in reaching a
property settlement. The appeals court reasoned that the wife can have no
vested co-ownership interest in property of the husband if the trial court
possesses discretion in making a property division which denies her the propex-
ty.41 Yet the trial court possessed the same discretionary power under the
Oklahoma statute in Collins, in which the Tenth Circuit found the wife to
have a species of common ownership. 42
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF Imel
Imel v. United States43 involved the transfer of appreciated corporate
stock pursuant to a court-approved property settlement. The Commissioner
whether owned by either spouse prior to marriage, acquired by either spouse
in his or her own right after marriage, or acquired by their joint efforts, in
a just and reasonable manner, either by a division of the property in kind, or
by setting the same or a part thereof over to one of the spouses and requiring
either to pay such sum as may be just and proper, or by ordering the sale of
the same under such conditions as the court may prescribe and dividing the
proceeds of such sale.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b) (1964).
37. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, had analogized the marital relationship to a
partnership. See Garver v. Garver, 184 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408 (1959); Cummings v.
Cummings, 138 Kan. 359, 26 P.2d 440 (1933).
38. See note 36 supra.
39. 60 T.C. at 61-62. The dissenting opinion considered the application of the Davis
and Collins decisions to the law of Kansas. The dissent felt the majority had erroneous-
ly interpreted Davis by restricting it to cases in which state property laws created the
joint interest in property. The dissenters thought that domestic relations law could also
create an interest in both spouses to jointly acquired property. Id. at 64-68.
40. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1975).
41. "If a wife were a co-owner in Kansas, her interest in the property to be divided
would be based on more than a right to a 'just and equitable share therein.'" Id. at 258.
42. 388 F.2d at 354.
43. 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
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held that the transfer was a taxable event and rendered a deficiency
assessment. Imel paid the assessment and sought a refund in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. The district court entered
a judgment against the United States, holding that the transaction was a
division of property between co-owners and not a sale or exchange resulting
in a capital gain. 44
The district court in Imel found that under a new Colorado law it
appeared that a wife had a species of common ownership similar to that
which had been recognized by the Tenth Circuit in Collins IV under
Oklahoma law.45 However, rather than interpreting Colorado law itself, the
court, pursuant to Colorado appellate rules, 46 certified the question to the
Supreme Court of Colorado for a definitive statement of the applicable
property law.47 The Colorado Supreme Court answered that "at the time
the divorce action was filed, there vested in the wife her interest in the
property in the name of the husband, ' 48 and that "under Colorado law, the
transfer involved here was a recognition of a 'species of common ownership'
of the marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between
co-owners.
'49
44. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973).
45. Id.,at 1115-16. A prior case decided under an earlier Colorado statute had
reached the opposite conclusion and found a taxable event upon the transfer. Pulliam v.
Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964). The district
court distinguished the cases on the basis that the statute in effect in Pulliam had
provided that "the court may make such order and decree providing for payment of
alimony and maintenance . . . as may be reasonable and just . . . or may decree a
division of property." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5 (1953). The statute governing
the lmel case, however, provided that "the court may make such orders, if any, as the
circumstances of the case may warrant relative to the division of property, in such
proportions as may be fair and equitable." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5 (1963),
as amended, § 46-1-13 (Supp. 1971).
46. COLO. S. CT. App. R. 21.1.
47. The question was phrased as follows:
When, under 1963 C.R.S. 46-1-5 [or under 1963 C.R.S. 46-1-13 as amended
in 1971]
(a) a property settlement agreement is entered into providing for a
transfer of property from husband to wife in acknowledgement of the
wife's contribution to the accumulation of the marital estate, or
(b) a decree of the divorce court requires such transfer because of
the wife's contributions to the accumulation of the family estate, and
(c) the transfer is not made in satisfaction of the husband's obligation
for support,
is the transfer a taxable event for the purposes of federal income taxation?
In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, 517 P.2d 1331, 1331-32 (Colo. 1974).
48. Id. at 1331.
49. Id. at 1334.
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A. State Court Controversy
After the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion, the government argued in
federal district court that despite the previous determination, the transfer was
taxable as a capital gain for purposes of federal income tax law. The
district court disagreed, however, and concluded that the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision was binding and that the transfer was a nontaxable division
of property."°
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the government argued that a state court
could not determine what constitutes a taxable event under federal income
tax laws. The appeals court concluded that while the occurrence of a
taxable event depended upon whether the transaction was a nontaxable
division of property by owners or whether it was a sale or exchange under
sections 1001(c) and 1002 of the Internal Revenue Code, the nature of the
property ownership was to be determined by the law of Colorado.5 1 The
court stated: "Legal interests and rights are created by, and exist under, state
law. Federal law determines what transactions involving interests or rights
created by state law shall be taxed."5 2  Criticizing the district court's
framing of the certified questions, the appeals court observed that the federal
district court should not have asked the Colorado Supreme Court if the
transaction was a taxable event; rather, it indicated that when a federal court
certifies questions under permissive state procedures, the court should frame
the question so that it only requires a determination of state law and that
"[a] federal court may not impose on a state court the responsibility for
determining a federal question."55
50. 375 F. Supp. at 1118.
51. 523 F.2d at 855.
52. Id., citing Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). This issue is not as
clear as the court asserts. The Court in Morgan stated that "If it is found in a given
case that an interest or right created by local law was the object intended to be taxed, the
federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or right by state
law." id. at 81.
In Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), the issue was whether a federal court
or agency in a federal estate tax controversy was conclusively bound by a state trial court
adjudication of relevant property rights when the United States was not a party to the
proceeding. The Supreme Court held that in actions arising under a federal statute, a
determination of a question of state law by a state trial court is not binding on federal
courts under the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The
Supreme Court seemed to indicate that only the highest state court decisions would be
deemed controlling in federal cases. 387 U.S. at 465.
In United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971), a case involving community
property interests, the Court stated that "federal income tax liability follows ownership
... . In the determination of ownership, state law controls." Id. at 197.
53. 523 F.2d at 857.
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Although it concluded that the certified questions had been worded
poorly, the appeals court held that the Colorado Supreme Court had
conclusively defined the rights and interests of the parties under Colorado
property law.54  The property settlement was thus a nontaxable division of
property between co-owners within the meaning of sections 1001 and 1002
of the Code.5 5 The result of the decision in Imel is that when the highest
court in a state makes a definitive determination of property law, that
characterization of ownership rights conclusively controls the federal tax
consequences.
B. Inconsistency in the Tenth Circuit
After the Colorado Supreme Court had defined rights and interests under
the Colorado law, but before the Tenth Circuit's affirmance in Imel, the
Tenth Circuit in another case, Hayutin v. Commissioner,56 read the Colo-
rado statute to create no ownership interest in the wife. In Hayutin, the
court stated that the characterization by the Colorado Supreme Court of the
wife's interest as a species of co-ownership which vested upon divorce was
not controlling for tax purposes. 57  The Hayutin court characterized the
Colorado law as placing a burden upon the husband's property rather than
making the wife a co-owner, and found that "[a] husband's property in
Colorado is basically free from any vested interest of the wife, except her
inchoate rights. . .. ,,"s The court went on to say that when the division of
marital property is discretionary with the court it is not possible to also find
co-ownership. 59
This is the same argument made in Davis and Wiles but rejected in Collins
IV and Imel. The statutes in Delaware, Kansas, Oklahoma and Colorado
all allow the trial court discretion to consider factors such as contribution,
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974). The Hayutin case involved a Colorado divorce
in which there was a complicated property settlement under which the husband was
required to make monthly payments of $700 and had the unexercised right to prepay a
sum of $163,000. The issue was the tax liability of the wife under sections 71 and 215
of the 1954 Code, arising from the monthly payments by the husband. The wife
unsuccessfully argued that the payments were a nontaxable division of property because
of the prepayment option. The liability of the husband for capital gain under sections
1001 or 1002 of the Code was not in issue. The court of appeals therefore concluded
that the questions of Davis, Pulliam, Collins IV and the certified questions decision of
the Colorado Supreme Court were not determinative in Hayutin. 508 F.2d at 469.
57. Id. at 468.
58. Id. at 469.
59. Id.
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need, and age in reaching a property settlement. Yet the Tenth Circuit
found the wife to have an ownership interest in Collins IV and Imel, but
reached a contrary result in Hayutin.60
The Hayutin court appeared to be saying that the determination of the
Colorado Supreme Court related specifically to the rights of the parties in the
property covered by the Imel transfer. Therefore, since a cash settlement
rather than appreciated property was involved in Hayutin, the characteriza-
tion of the property interest was not binding."' The distinction is obscure,
particularly since the rationale for certifying questions to the state court is to
obtain a definitive interpretation of the relevant property law. The appeals
court in Hayutin could have found a taxable transaction under the applicable
Code sections without resorting to the oft-cited Davis criteria for owner-
ship. As a result of Hayutin, it is possible to conclude that the Imel holding
was based more on a showing of substantial contribution than a reliance on
the Colorado court's statutory interpretation. Whether the Tenth Circuit will
follow Imel in a case in which there is no clear showing of contribution
remains unclear.
In affirming the district court's decision in Imel and in holding that the
transfer was a nontaxable division of co-owned property, the appeals court
followed its reasoning in Collins IV. This represents a shift from the criteria
used in Davis to determine ownership. In neither Imel nor Collins IV did
the court find descendibility, power to control or manage, or a right of
disposition. However, it is difficult to reconcile Collins IV and Imel with
Wiles. It is necessary, therefore, to look beyond the holdings to find some
factors which would explain the conflicting results.
III. AVOIDING THE Davis CONSEQUENCES
A. Joint Acquisition of Property
For several years after the Davis decision, it appeared settled that in
common law jurisdictions the transfer of appreciated property pursuant to a
divorce would result in taxable gain for the husband. Although the Davis
Court stated that its "view may permit different tax treatment among the
60. The court of appeals in Imel attempted to distinguish Hayutin on its facts and on
the basis that other sections of the Internal Revenue Code were involved in Hayutin. 523
F.2d at 856. While it is true the issues in Hayutin were different from those in Imel, the
court's characterizations of the wife's interest under the same Colorado statute in Hayutin
and Imel are irreconcilable. The Hayutin court characterized the wife's interest under
Colorado law as identical to that of the wife in Davis as decided under Delaware law.
508 F.2d at 469. Yet in Imel, the court found the Colorado Supreme Court's determina-
tion of a species of co-ownership under Colorado law to be conclusive. 523 F.2d at 857.
61. 523 F.2d at 857.
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several states, ' '62 few states looked beyond the general characteristics men-
tioned in Davis in interpreting the relevant property law.6   Ownership
interests have traditionally been created by property law. These interests,
however, can also be said to have been created by divorce statutes, 64 as
demonstrated in cases involving the concept of jointly acquired property.6 5
Thus, a property right could be found in both spouses who have contributed
to the enhancement in value of property brought about by the joint effort of
husband and wife during their marriage. If property is found to be jointly
acquired, it is immaterial in whose name any of the property is held at the
time it is divided by the divorce court. A division of property may
necessarily involve the transfer of title from one spouse to another and this is
true even in the division of property in a community property state. 66 If
this property is jointly acquired, however, the transfer of title would not be a
sale or exchange within sections 1001 and 1002 of the Code because each
spouse would be a co-owner.
Although the Oklahoma and Kansas statutes requiring mandatory division
of property are unusual for common law jurisdictions, most states have
provided for division of property based on equitable considerations.6 7 This
equity is based on the recognition of each spouse's contribution toward the
acquisition of property after marriage, as well as age, need, style of living
and length of the marriage. By recognition of property rights in jointly
acquired property, a nontaxable division of property could be found. This
result can be achieved through legislation or by the courts. However, as
illustrated by Wiles, the Tax Court may still find a taxable event when a
statute recognizes the concept of jointly acquired property. Thus, in order to
be assured of a nontaxable division of property, it appears that it is necessary
to have a decision by the highest court of a state characterizing the interest
of the wife as a species of common ownership. Without an affirmative
statement of this nature, a nontaxable division remains doubtful.
A 1974 revenue ruling acknowledges that a nontaxable division is possible
in common law jurisdictions but fails to provide any mechanism for making
62. 370 U.S. at7l.
63. See cases cited note 19 supra.
64. See Richard E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. 56, 64 (1973) (Goffe, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Zeller v. Zeller, 195 Kan. 452, 407 P.2d 478 (1965); Tobin v. Tobin, 89
Okla. 12, 213 P. 884 (1923).
66. See de Funiak, A Review in Brief of Principles of Community Property, 32 Ky.
L.J. 63 (1943).
67. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.200 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1964);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40 § 18 (1972); IND. CODE § 31-1-12 to -17 (1973), TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-825 (1955).
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such a determination prior to the writing of a settlement agreement. 68 The
ruling states that "[piroperty may be co-owned where (1) title to it is taken
jointly under State property law, (2) the State is a community property law
State, or (3) State property law is found to be similar to community property
law." 69  The inclusion of subsection three indicates that the Internal Reve-
nue Service has recognized that certain states may have created a property
interest in marital property similar to that which exists in a community
property state. The questions unresolved by this ruling are when state law is
deemed to be similar, and whether the issue must be addressed by the
highest court in the state before the state determination is to be binding upon
a federal court. The Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected
the taxpayer's case in Wiles because of the lack of a decision by the highest
court in Kansas characterizing the ownership interests under Kansas law.70
B. Lack of Federal Criteria
Prior to Collins IV, the courts had looked to the Davis decision as
providing federal criteria, such as rights of management and control, disposi-
tion, and descendibility, that must be met before finding co-ownership. The
courts found none of the above mentioned criteria in either Collins IV or
Imel, yet a species of co-ownership was found which resulted in a nontaxable
division of property.71 This represents a change from the criteria used in
Davis to determine co-ownership in divorce settlements. Whether other
courts will use the traditional criteria mentioned in Davis or, under a more
expanded state law approach, use criteria similar to those in Imel or Collins
IV is uncertain. It is possible that the Davis criteria would be invalid even
in community property states, depending upon the wording of individual
statutes.
Although the wife has a present vested interest in property acquired after
marriage in community property jurisdictions, the husband may be deemed
the manager of the property with the right to alienate it without the
consent or permission of the wife.72  Hence, within a community property
68. Rev. Rul. 347, 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 26.
69. Id. at 27.
70. 60 T.C. at 61; 499 F.2d at 258.
71. 412 F.2d at 212; 523 F.2d at 857.
72. In discussing the Louisiana community property statute in United States v.
Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971), the Supreme Court stated:
The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community of gains;
he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and
may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and permission of
his wife.
Id. at 198, citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (1971).
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state, a wife may not have rights of control, management or disposition. Yet
the wife is unquestionably a co-owner. 73  Perhaps a better view of state
property statutes would look to an equitable and just division of property
based on contribution toward jointly acquired property rather than the
previously cited criteria. This would allow a nontaxable division without
meeting the traditional ownership criteria cited in Davis.
C. The Contribution Concept
One important factor in the Imel decision that received scant attention
from the appeals court may provide a useful tool in reconciling prior
decisions. The Imel court stated that "[u]nder the findings of both the state
and federal courts the wife materially aided the accumulation of the family
wealth and the settlement agreement was a fair division of the property. '74
In the district court, the court described in great length the "substantial
contributions ![made by Mrs. Imel] to the accumulation of the family
estate."'75  Citing state case law authority, 76 the court observed that "under
Colorado law an equitable award of money or property to the wife is
dependent upon ,[the] extent of her contribution .... -77
That a characterization of a wife's interest may turn on her respective
contribution to the marital property is illustrated by the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Wallace v. United States.78 In Wallace, the district court had
determined that Iowa law, 79 like that of Delaware, granted taxpayer Wallace's
former spouse no interest, active or passive, in the taxpayer's personal prop-
erty prior to the entry of the divorce. In holding that the transfer of property
was properly taxable, the appeals court found the cases cited by the taxpayer
which held that the wife was a co-owner of the property to be inapplicable
73. "The wife's half interest in the community property is not a mere expectancy
during the marriage .... The title for half of the community property is vested in the
wife the moment it is acquired by the community or by spouses jointly ...... 403 U.S.
at 199, citing Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 825-26, 107 So. 584, 588 (1926).
74. 523 F.2d at 857.
75. 375 F. Supp. at 1105.
76. Of particular interest is the case of Kraus v. Kraus, 159 Colo. 331, 411 P.2d 240
(1966), in which the issue was whether the court could make a cash property settlement
in its discretion. The Kraus court stated:
Matters of property division and alimony rest within the sound discretion of
the trial court .... Whether the wife has contributed to or in some manner
aided in the accumulation or preservation of assets sought to be divided must
be ascertained [by the court].
Id. at 333, 411 P.2d at 241-42.
77. 375 F. Supp. at 1111, citing Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 498, 175 P.2d 386
(1946).
78. 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
79. IowA CoDE ANN. § 598.14 (1950), as amended, § 598.21 (Supp. 1976).
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because substantial evidence had been presented in each of those cases to
show that the wife had contributed to the property in question either by her
labor or her earnings. The Eighth Circuit stated that there was no evidence of
contribution by the wife in Wallace."°  The implication was that upon a
showing of contribution by labor or earnings, the court might have found co-
ownership in the property. While in many cases it is apparent that a wife
has contributed substantially to acquisition of property through labor or
earnings, 8' it is unlikely that contribution would be found in the case of a
wife who has remained a housewife.8 2 In order to find contribution under
such circumstances, the court would have to view the marital estate as a joint
economic unit.
A finding of substantial contribution through labor or earnings should
suffice to characterize a wife as co-owner of jointly acquired property.83 A
nontaxable division of property would then be possible in those states which
have discretionary property division statutes.8 4
80. 439 F.2d at 761.
81. See, e.g., Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971). In Mills, the
court observed that the wife had acquired an interest in property accumulated during
marriage through her efforts and skills. Her activities during the years of marriage were
more extensive than those of an ordinary housewife. The payments in question were
intended to be a property settlement-a division of the property in which the wife had
acquired an interest by her contribution. Id. at 1151.
82. In Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
836 (1964), see note 17 supra, after finding a taxable event the court stated: "In
this instance the wife performed the usual duties of a housewife, and performed no other
tasks to specifically assist in the accumulation of property and brought no property into
the marriage." Id. at 98.
The principle of contribution has long been recognized in the estate and gift tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. When there has been separate monetary
contribution on the part of the wife, the entire value of the transfer is not taxable to the
husband, and the wife's proportionate contribution to jointly held property is deducted
from the husband's gross estate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040. The application of
the contribution principle to property divisions under the income tax code would include
recognition of contribution based on labor as well as earnings.
Under section 2516 of the gift tax code, when the husband and wife enter into a
agreement relating to marital and property rights and a divorce occurs within two years,
any transfers of property pursuant to the agreement are deemed to be made for full and
adequate consideration and no gift tax is owed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515.
83. Thus, marital property in common law jurisdictions would be subject to the same
tax consequences as community property and the wife would be given a statutory interest
in recognition of her contribution to the property.
84. An example of the harsh result that can occur if there is a taxable rather than a
nontaxable division of property is the situation in which the major or sole asset of the
husband is ownership of a closely held business corporation. If the husband is forced to
transfer an interest in the business to the wife he may be confronted with a large tax
liability and no funds to satisfy the obligation.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of both Collins IV and Imel, it is now possible to have a
nontaxable division of appreciated property and avoid the harsh conse-
quences of Davis in a common law state. 85 It remains unclear, however,
whether the Tax Court will allow the lmel result without a definitive ruling
designating the property interests as a species of co-ownership by the highest
court in the state.
Imel may result in more trial courts finding ownership in the wife created
by substantial contribution toward the acquisition of property when state
statutes are similar to those in Oklahoma or Colorado. Such a characteriza-
tion may be given great weight by higher courts in light of the lmel result.
In ImeI, neither the husband nor the wife was taxed on the division of the
property. The transferee took the transferor's basis. Upon the sale of the
property, the transferee will recognize capital gain on the difference between
the adjusted basis and the sale price. The elevation of the wife to the status
of co-owner or species of co-owner therefore results in a tax disadvantage to
the wife, since her basis in the property will be lower and thus her capital
gains greater upon its disposition. This disadvantage, however, could be
lessened by a more equitable division of the property acquired after mar-
riage. When jointly acquired property is distributed on the basis of contribu-
tion, each party would receive a just share and the tax burden would also be
borne equally.
In a common law state in which the Davis result is expected, the
transferor may be reluctant to transfer jointly acquired property since the tax
consequences may be severe. 'Under the Davis rationale, the transferor may
be left with a huge tax bill and no property or income as a result of the
transfer. Ownership criteria cited in Davis, such as descendibility and the
right to control and manage, do not have great relevance to the modern view
of marriage as a joint economic unit in which both partners aid in the joint
acquisition of property. For this reason state property and divorce statutes
in common law states should be revised so that jointly acquired property can
be justly divided.
Recognition of the concept of jointly acquired property through contribu-
tion would tend to obliterate the distinction between common law and
community property states. Revisions of the tax code in the past have been
85. It should be noted that the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, a model code
written by the National Conference of Commissioners on Unified State Laws, recom-
mends that division of property be based on need and contribution. The Act also
recognizes a spouse's contribution through care and maintenance of the home. UNI-
FORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 307 (alternative A and B).
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aimed at equalizing such differences.86 Unless or until Congress amends
the income tax code to exclude the possibility of finding a taxable event
upon the transfer of appreciated property pursuant to a divorce, a nontaxa-
ble division in common law states can only be achieved through the courts
with the help of the state legislatures. Imel illustrates how the courts can
equalize the effect of the tax law without any amendment to the tax code. At
the present time, however, without a ruling from the highest court in the
state defining the property interest, the transfer of appreciated property in
divorce or separation may be found to be a taxable event and the additional
tax costs of such a transfer must be calculated in all property settlements in
common law states.
Ellen S. Deutsch
86. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 110. See also Brown, Conflict of Laws
Between Community Property and Common Law States in Division of Marital Property
on Divorce, 12 MERCER L.R. 287 (1961); Rudick, Federal Tax Problems Relating to
Property Owned in Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by the Entirety, 4 TAx L.R. 3 (1948).
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